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Lack of imagination can bias our view of animal sentience
Commentary on Crump et al on Decapod Sentience
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Abstract: How an animal reacts to a sensory stimulus is often used to assess
whether that animal can experience feelings such as pain and pleasure. This
behavioural path is typically complemented with reference to how a human
would normally respond to and experience an analogous stimulus. Together,
these approaches can lead to a “hard to imagine otherwise” argument for
feelings. It is time to go beyond these qualitative assessments and to now
determine whether a nervous system can execute the neural functions
necessary for sentience.

Brian Key is Professor of Neuroscience and
Head of the Neurophilosophy Lab,
University of Queensland. Brian Key &
Deborah Brown were together awarded
an Australian Research Discovery Grant
entitled “Towards closure on the fish pain
debate” Website

Deborah Brown is Professor of Philosophy
and Director of the Critical Thinking
Project, University of Queensland.
Website

We are born with it and experience it every subsequent waking moment. It is
difficult to contemplate human life without the feelings of sight, touch,
hearing, smell, and taste. They seem to constantly motivate us to behave the
way we do.
But what about nonhuman animals—how do we know which animals have
feelings such as pleasure or pain? A “hard to imagine otherwise” argument is
commonly used to assert that certain animals must be sentient. As Jonathan
Balcombe (2020), put it: "if we stop to watch insects closely — their
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coordinated movements and complex, flexible actions — it seems hard to
imagine them as little blank slates, going about their lives in a mental vacuum,
without even a smidgen of awareness.”
But could it be that our imagination is merely failing us?
How obvious is it that our own complex behaviours necessarily depend on
conscious awareness? Let’s test this idea by looking at one of the most complex
of all human behaviours—speech. Many people engage in uncontrolled and
unaware speech every night—sleep-talking. There are some extreme examples
that are truly “hard to imagine” as not depending on a smidgen of awareness.
Consider the example of a patient who suffered from aphasia (the loss of fluent
and coherent speech) following a brain stroke (Straus et al., 1996). Ordinarily,
this patient’s speech patterns were distorted, for example:
“How butterfly goes through... butterfly… Butterfly goes through… hutterfu::es...
but- tertly goes three processes of life… be::fore before before it um before it’s an
adult… before it big before it big.” [:: demarcates abnormal vowel prolongations.]

Surprisingly, during sleep-talking, this patient spoke fluently, with normal
syntax and rhythm. Clearly, the patient had no conscious control over this
behaviour while asleep; if he did, his speech would have been distorted.
What are the lessons to be learnt here for judging whether a given species of
animal is sentient or not? First, just because it is “hard to imagine” an animal
doing what it is doing non-consciously, it doesn’t follow that it is sentient.
Second, we should expect that nervous systems have evolved to perform many
functions without the need for either conscious control or feelings. And third,
similarities between an animal’s behaviour and our ‘complex, flexible actions’
are not a valid basis for judging whether the animal’s behaviour is consciously
controlled.
The target article by Crump et al. (2022) concludes that decapod crustaceans
(e.g., crabs) most likely feel pain. Crump and colleagues claim that certain
behaviours could only be performed by animals capable of feeling. The
structure of Crump et al.’s argument fits that of the "hard to imagine
otherwise" argument for animal sentience Why else would an injured animal
prefer a substance laced with “pain-killing” (analgesic) drugs if not because it
feels pain? Though popular, this kind of argument is inconclusive since such
compounds can block non-conscious, pain-free behaviours as well as pain (if
present).
Before we too easily jump to conclusions, we must take a good look at the
animal’s nervous system and assess whether it has the capacity to perform the
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neural functions underpinning feelings (Key et al., 2022). [See also Key 2016.]
It is well accepted that awareness is the fundamental basis of feelings. For
example, unless aware of a bee’s sting, you won’t feel pain. Given that a
nervous system has no direct connection with the external environment it can
only ever infer what it is processing based on its own internal neural activity.
Therefore, a nervous system can possibly be sentient only if it has evolved the
means both (1) of monitoring its own internal processing of sensory
information and (2) of making inferences about what it is processing. An
analogy would be an observer watching a chess game and figuring out what
are correct moves in the game. If from monitoring the game the observer can
predict future player moves, then the observer has some level of awareness of
the rules of the game. “Observer networks” operate in nervous systems in
similar ways and have specific physiological functions and anatomical
structures related to the neural explanation of feelings.
We find observer networks in the mammalian brain, but not in the spinal cord
(Key and Brown, 2018; Key et al., 2021; Key et al., 2022). We need to search
for them in the crab nervous system. It is part of the natural evolution of any
science to dispense with "hard to imagine otherwise" justifications, and the
study of animal sentience is no exception.
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